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Abstract
Classical logic (the logic of non-constructive mathematics) is stronger than
intuitionistic logic (the logic of constructive mathematics). Despite this, there
are copies of classical logic in intuitionistic logic. All copies usually found in
the literature are the same. This raises the question: is the copy unique? We
answer negatively by presenting three different copies.
1 Philosophy
1.1 Non-constructive and constructive proofs
Mathematicians commonly use an indirect method of proof called non-constructive
proof: they prove the existence of an object without presenting (constructing) the
object. However, may times they can also use a direct method of proof called
constructive proof: to prove the existence of an object by presenting (constructing)
the object.
Definition 1.
• A non-constructive proof is a proof that proves the existence of an object with-
out presenting the object.
• A constructive proof is a proof that proves the existence of an object by pre-
senting the object.
From a logical point of view, a non-constructive proof uses the law of excluded
middle while a constructive proof does not use the law of excluded middle.
Definition 2. The law of excluded middle is the assertion “every statement is true
or false”.
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To illustrate this discussion, let us see the usual example of a theorem with
non-constructive and constructive proofs.
Theorem 3. There are irrational numbers x and y such that xy is a rational number.
Non-constructive proof. By the law of excluded middle,
√
2
√
2
is a rational number
or an irrational number.
Case
√
2
√
2
is a rational number. Let x =
√
2 and y =
√
2. Then x and y are
irrational numbers such that xy =
√
2
√
2
is a rational number.
Case
√
2
√
2
is an irrational number. Let x =
√
2
√
2
and y =
√
2. Then x and y are
irrational numbers such that xy = 2 is a rational number.
Note that the above proof is non-constructive because the proof does not present
x and y since the proof does not decide which case holds true. Also note that the
proof uses the law of excluded middle.
Constructive proof. Let x =
√
2
√
2
and y =
√
2. Then x (by the Gelfond-Schneider
theorem) and y are irrational numbers such that xy = 2 is a rational number.
Note that the above proof is constructive because the proof presents x and y.
Also note that the proof does not use the law of excluded middle.
1.2 Constructivism
We saw that mathematicians use both non-constructive and constructive proofs.
There is a school of thought in philosophy of mathematics, called constructivism,
which rejects non-constructive proofs in favour of constructive proofs.
Definition 4. Constructivism is the philosophy of mathematics that insists on con-
structive proofs.
Let us see some motivations for constructivism.
Philosophical motivations.
• The more radical constructivists simply consider non-constructive proofs
unsound. The less radical constructivists consider that non-constructive
proofs may be sound, but not as sound as constructive proofs.
• Some constructivists reject the mind-independent nature of mathematical
objects. So for a mathematician to prove the existence of an object,
he/she has to give existence to the object by constructing the object in
his/her mind.
• Non-constructivism puts the emphasis on truth (as in “every statement
is true or false”), while constructivism puts the emphasis on justification
(as in “we have a justification to believe that a statement is true, or we
have a justification to believe that the statement is false”). Given an
arbitrary statement, in general there is no justification to believe that
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the statement is true and no justification to believe that the statement
is false, so a constructivist would not assert “every statement is true or
false”, that is a constructivist rejects the law of excluded middle.
• Non-constructivism does not differentiate between the quantifications
¬∀x¬ and ∃x, but constructivism is more refined because it differentiates
between them:
– ¬∀x¬ means the usual “there exists an x”;
– ∃x has the stronger meaning of “there exists an x and we know x”.
Mathematical motivations.
• Constructive proofs are more informative than non-constructive proofs
because they not only prove the existence of an object, but even give us
an example of such an object.
• We can use the constructive setting to study non-constructive principles.
In the usual setting of mathematics, which includes non-constructive prin-
ciples, there is no way to tell the difference between what results from
the setting and what results from the non-constructive principles. But in
a constructive setting we can isolate the role of non-constructive princi-
ples. For example, if we want to determine which theorems are implied
by the axiom of choice, we need to do it in set theory without the axiom
of choice.
• There are several tools in mathematical logic that work fine for construc-
tive proofs but not for non-constructive proofs. So in order to benefit
from these tools we should move to a constructive setting. For example,
the extraction of computational content using Go¨del’s functional inter-
pretation can always be done for constructive proofs but has restrictions
for non-constructive proofs.
Historical motivation.
• Until the 19th century all proofs in mathematics were more or less con-
structive. Then in the second half of the 19th century there were intro-
duced powerful, infinitary, abstracts, non-constructive principles. These
principles were already polemic at the time. Even worse, at the turn of the
century there were discovered paradoxes related to these non-constructive
principles. Then it was not only a question of what principles are accept-
able, but even the consistency of mathematics was at stake. Construc-
tivism proposes a solution to this crisis: to restrict ourselves to the safer
constructive principles, which are less likely to produce paradoxes.
2 Mathematics
2.1 Classical and intuitionistic logics
We saw that non-constructivism uses the law of excluded middle while construc-
tivism does not use the law of excluded middle. Let us now formulate this idea in
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terms of logic.
Definition 5.
• Classical logic CL is (informally) the usual logic of mathematics including the
law of excluded middle.
• Intuitionistic logic IL is (informally) the usual logic of mathematics excluding
the law of excluded middle.
To be sure, CL corresponds to non-constructivism, and IL corresponds to con-
structivism.
Now let us compare CL and IL. We can prove the following.
• CL is strictly stronger than IL (that is there are theorems of CL that are not
theorems of IL, but every theorem of IL is a theorem of CL).
• CL is non-constructive (that is there are proofs in CL that cannot be turned
into constructive proofs) while IL is constructive (that is every proof in IL can
be turned into a constructive proof).
2.2 Copies
To introduce the notion of a copy of classical logic in intuitionistic logic, first we
need to introduce the notion of a negative translation.
Definition 6. A negative translation is a mapping N of formulas that embeds CL
in IL in the sense of satisfying the following two conditions.
Respecting provability. For all formulas A and sets Γ of formulas we have the im-
plication CL+ Γ ⊢ A ⇒ IL+ ΓN ⊢ AN (where ΓN = {AN : A ∈ Γ});
Faithfulness. For all formulas A we have CL ⊢ A↔ AN .
A copy of classical logic in intuitionistic logic is the image imN (the set of all formu-
las of the form AN ) of a negative translation N [1, paragraph 14.5] [2, definition 1].
Let us explain why it is fair to say that an image is a copy of classical logic in
intuitionistic logic. From the definition of a negative translation we get the following
equivalence:
CL ⊢ A ⇔ IL ⊢ AN .
We can read this equivalence in the following way: the formulas AN in imN are
mirroring in IL the behaviour of CL. So imN is a reflection, a copy, of classical logic
in intuitionistic logic.
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2.3 Question: is the copy unique?
There are four negative translations usually found in the literature; they are due to
Kolmogorov, Go¨del-Gentzen, Kuroda and Krivine. The simplest one to describe is
Kolmogorov’s negative translation: it simply double negates every subformula of a
given formula.
All the usual negative translations give the same copy: the negative fragment.
Definition 7. The negative fragment NF is (essentially) the set of formulas without
∨ and ∃.
The fact that all the usual negative translations give the same copy leads us to
ask: is the copy unique?
Here we should mention that when we say that two copies are equal, we do not
mean “syntactically/literally equal” (that would be too strong and easily falsified);
we mean “equal modulo IL” (that is “modulo identifying formulas that are provably
equivalent in IL”).
2.4 Answer: no
In the following theorem we show that the answer to our question is no by presenting
three different copies.
Theorem 8. Let us fix a formula F such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F (there are such
formulas F ). Then
• NF
• NF ∨ F = {A ∨ F : A ∈ NF}
• NF[F/⊥] = {A[F/⊥] : A ∈ NF}
are pairwise different copies [1, paragraph 14.10] [2, lemma 7, theorem 8 and propo-
sition 9].
Sketch of the proof. We have to show the following three things.
There is an F such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F . We can prove that F = ¬(∀x¬¬P (x) →
∀xP (x)) (where P (x) is a unary predicate symbol) is in the desired condi-
tions [1, paragraph 14.11.6] [2, proof of lemma 7.1].
NF, NF ∨ F and NF[F/⊥] are copies. Let K be Kolmogorov’s negative translation,
AM = AK∨F and AN = AK [F/⊥] [1, paragraph 14.8] [2, definition 6]. We can
prove that K, M and N are negative translations (here we use the hypothesis
CL ⊢ ¬F ) such that imK = NF, imM = NF ∨ F and imN = NF[F/⊥] [1,
paragraph 14.10] [2, theorem 8]. This is pictured in figure 1.
NF, NF ∨ F and NF[F/⊥] are different. We can prove that the images of two nega-
tive translations are equal if and only if the negative translations are pointwise
equal (modulo IL) [1, paragraph 14.11.4]. And we can prove that K, M and
N are not pointwise equal by proving IL 0 ⊥M → ⊥K , IL 0 ⊥N → ⊥K and
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IL 0 PN → PM (where P is a nullary predicate symbol different from ⊥) (here
we use the hypothesis IL 0 ¬F ) [1, paragraph 14.11] [2, proofs of theorem 8.3
and proposition 9].
CL
CL
IL
NF
NF ∨ F NF[F/⊥]
K
M
N
Figure 1: the negative translations K, M and N , and the copies NF, NF ∨ F and
NF[F/⊥].
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